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THE URBAN NEXUS: OPEN SPACE, BROWNFIELDS,
AND JUSTICE
Paul Stanton Kibel*
The belief among suburbanites that they are independent of central
cities is a delusion.l
INTRODUCTION: RECLAIMING THE CITY

It is a common instinct to adopt simple explanations for complex
problems. To make sense of the crises that confront us, we seek to
isolate the trigger, the underlying force behind all that is not right.
The declining state of America's urban centers provides a prime example of our drive to pinpoint the cause, to name and reveal the
particular policy, institution, or group of persons that is the true
CUlprit.
The reality of urban decline in America, particularly in our older
cities, is one of the only points not in dispute.2 The statistics provide
clear evidence of the situation and of the general trends that are at
work. For several decades the U.S. population has been moving from
urban centers to suburban locations, and the number of citizens living
in the suburbs now exceeds the number of citizens living in the cities.s
Open space surrounding urban centers is rapidly being converted to
residential and commercial use, while large tracts of urban housing

* Adjunct Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law (San Francisco); Faculty Editor
for special edition of GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. on The City and the Environment; LL.M.
Candidate, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Willamette University; B.A., Colgate College. The author thanks the members of the San Francisco
Brownfields Working Group for their help with this Essay.
1 ANTHONY DOWNS, BROOKINGS INST. AND LINCOLN INST., NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 52 (1994).
2 See generally id.
3Id. at 57.
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and commercial property are now vacant, polluted, or both.4 The gap
in per capita income between urban residents and suburban residents
is growing ever wider, and the crime and unemployment rates in
urban areas are growing higher.5 Minority populations in declining
urban cores have become more geographically isolated, creating a
situation of de facto segregation.s As the city tax base declines, municipal governments have less resources to support education, police,
and other essential services, thereby furthering urban decline and the
exodus to the suburbs.7
These statistics and observations are not offered in support of any
argument. They are simply a summary of a broad economic, environmental, and racial phenomenon that most of us have observed with
our own eyes and experienced in our own lives. In its most condensed
form, this phenomenon is as follows: Jobs and people are moving out
of urban centers into formerly pristine surrounding areas leaving
behind polluted vacant lots and unemployed minority populations.8
4 See Steven F. Fairlie, The New Greenfields Legislation: A Practitioner's Guide to Recycling
Old Industrial Sites, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 77, 78 (1996).
6 See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 47.
Another force weakening ties between central cities and suburbs is an increasingly
geographic separation of socioeconomic groups. In 1990, median household income was
38 percent higher in the suburbs than in the central cities. In metropolitan areas of 1
million or more residents, household income was 45 percent higher in suburbs; in
smaller metropolitan areas the difference was 26 percent. Low-income people are
becoming more and more concentrated in central cities ••••
Id.
6 See PENNSYLVANIA HORTICULTURAL SOC'Y, URBAN VACANT LAND: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17 (1995) [hereinafter URBAN VACANT LAND].
In the years after World War II people-primarily Whites-lured by the dream of
single family houses with yards and the availability of cheap mortgage financing, and
driven by racial fears, began moving to suburban communities.••• This pattern has
••• also contributed to center city abandonment and the isolation of disadvantaged
urban communities that are increasingly segregated by both race and class.
Id.
7 See Steven K. Koyasako, Brownfields-CaLifornia EPA's Policy and Legal Response, 4
LAND USE & ENV'T F. 155, 155 (1995). ''Vacant brownfields sites are not only a wasted resource;
they also significantly erode the tax base and contribute to urban blight and economic decline
in historically industrial urban centers." Id.; see also William B. Shore, Recentralization: Tho
Single Answer to More Than a Dozen United Swtes Problems and a Major Answer to Poverty,
J. AM. PLANNING AsS'N, at 500 (Fall 1995). "As more well-to-do households and major non-residential taxpayers moved out of the cities and the burdens of poverty become more concentrated
in cities, taxes went up and services declined for those who remained." Id. (emphasis in original);
see also URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, THE BROWNFIELDS LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT AND
COMMUNITY REVITALIZATION PROJECT 1 (1995) (''Urban communities of color bear the brunt,
battered by unemployment, deepening environmental inequities and cutbacks in social services,
health care and education.")
8 See PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS: ECOLOGY, COMMUNITY AND
THE AMERICAN DREAM 9 (1993). "The result of this era is that both the city and the suburb are
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Although it is not too difficult a task to describe the reality of urban
decline, it is another task altogether to identify and isolate the underlying trigger of this decline. Many different culprits have been proposed, including racism, capitalism, environmental extremism, postindustrialism, technology, drugs, the media, the automobile, the
police, the public school system, too much government regulation, and
too little government regulation. Is one of the these issues or entities
the true cause? Is there a precise cause and effect explanation for why
our cities are now subject to such powerful and destructive economic,
environmental, and racial pressures?
These are important questions, but questions that I will not try to
answer in this Essay. Regardless of whether there initially was an
underlying trigger, we have reached a point where the various components of urban decline are now feeding on and reinforcing each
other.9 They are all interconnected contributors to the downward
spiral that has left our urban cores in their current condition.10 Therefore, instead of arguing for or against a particular underlying cause,
this Essay will focus on the relation among certain critical components
of the urban decline cycle. More specifically, I will assess three particular components: (1) the impact of suburban sprawl and open space
conversion on the urban economy and the environment; (2) the impact
of environmental hazardous waste liability on the development of
urban neighborhoods and the urban economy; and (3) the impact of
suburban sprawl and environmental hazardous waste liability on the
health conditions and economic welfare of poor, primarily minority,
communities living in the urban core. Although my analysis will draw
extensively on the experience in the San Francisco Bay Area, this
Essay is not city-specific. The Essay addresses issues that are affecting virtually every major U.S. metropolitan area.
To be certain, open space loss, abandoned brownfields, and economic inequity are not the only components of the urban decline cycle.
However, they are three areas in which existing law, especially in
terms of land-use zoning and environmental liability, has played a
crucial role. They therefore are also areas where legal reform potennow locked in a mutually negating evolution toward loss of community. In practical terms, these
patterns of growth have created on one side congestion, pollution and isolation, and on the other
urban disinvestment and economic hardship." Id.
9 See URBAN VACANT LAND, supra note 6, at 18; see generally JAMES BoYD ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE IMPACTS OF UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY ON
INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
(1994).
10 See Carl Anthony, Making Brownfields Bloom, LAND AND PEOPLE, Fall 1996, at 25.
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tially can playa crucial role in reversing the pattern of urban decline.
By providing a useful framework in which to evaluate such reform,
this Essay should assist lawyers and other citizens who are working
to reclaim our cities as beautiful, vibrant, and just communities.
Section I discusses the origins and impacts of, and responses to,
open space conversion. Section II addresses the impact of hazardous
waste liability laws on the abandonment of urban properties, and how
new federal and state reforms might enable reclamation of these
so-called ''brownfields.'' Section III explains how zoning, environ, mental liability, and brownfields reclamation have impacted the economic and health conditions of poor communities living in the urban
core. Section IV discusses strategies to reconcile the goals of open
space preservation, hazardous waste remediation, and justice.

I.

OPEN SPACE AND THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS

For the past half century, there has been one dominant paradigm
for metropolitan growth in the United States. That paradigm has
been described as unlimited suburban sprawlll or ''low density discontinuous development."12 The basic component of this metropolitan
paradigm has been the conversion of wilderness and farmland, commonly called open space, to commercial and residential use. 18 In this
conversion scenario, the emphasis has been on the development of
shopping centers and business/industrial parks (for commercial use),
and planned communities with detached, single family homes with
yards (for residential use).14
Before turning to the present day economic and environmental
consequences of this development pattern, I will first revisit its origins. In the modern context, the terms "city" and "suburb" have taken
on very strong political and cultural meanings. As Zignew Rybczynski, an urban historian at the University of Pennsylvania, explained
in his 1995 book, City Life, the two terms "are often only polemical
categories: depending on your point of view, either bad (dangerous,
11 See BANK OF AMERICA, THE CALIFORNIA RESOURCES AGENCY, GREENBELT ALLIANCE
AND THE Low INCOME HOUSING FUND, BEYOND SPRAWL: NEW PATl'ERNS OF GROWTH TO FIT
THE NEW CALIFORNIA 1-5 (1995) [hereinafter BEYOND SPRAWL].
12 See STEVEN HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA BLDG. INDUS. AsS'N, PRESERVING THE AMERIOAN
DREAM: THE FACTS ABOUT SUBURBAN COMMUNITIES AND HOUSING CHOICE 1 (1996).
18 See Jim Sayer, Green Edges for Healthy Cities, THE URBAN ECOLOGIST, Spring 1994, at 1i
see also ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS; THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA 167

(1987).
14 See URBAN VACANT LAND,

supra note 6, at 14-16.
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polluted, concrete) cities and good (safe, healthy, green) suburbs, or
good (diverse, dense, stimulating) cities and bad (homogeneous,
sprawling, dull) suburbs."15 Beneath these polarized meanings, however, there is a great deal of historical and ideological undergrowth.
We must examine this undergrowth to make sense of where we are
today, to place the debate over open space conversion and the exploding metropolis in a broader context.
Although the conversion of open space to commercial and residential use is often thought of as a recent trend, in many ways it is a
continuation of a deeply ingrained American tradition.16 This tradition
is based on the frontier. For hundreds of years, the American experience involved the push westward across the continent, clearing wilderness and breaking the landP The American frontier provided an
outlet for those who were dissatisfied with their economic or social
prospects in a given location; they could vote with their feet, by
moving west to a less congested, less socially stratified, or less expensive region of the country.IS
The outlet of the frontier played a critical role in shaping the u.S.
economy and American society. It meant that the upward mobility of
the lower and middle classes need not come at the direct expense of
the more established upper class; that issues of economic equity and
justice could be put off indefinitely. It meant that Americans were less
tied to geographic place, and therefore when confronted with regional
problems, were more likely to move than to seek place-specific solutions. 19 The national experience with the western frontier helped establish the values and patterns that would later lead to suburban
sprawl and urban decay.
The forces that would contribute to the geographic decentralization
of urban areas were identified early on. In 1900, H.G. Wells published

15 ZIGNEW

RYBCZYNSKI, CITY LIFE 176 (1995).
.
See Dan Tarlock, City Versus Countryside: Environmental Equity in Context, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 461, 482-83 (1994).
17 See BROOKINGS INST. AND THE LINCOLN mST. FOR LAND POL'y, ALTERNATIVES TO
SPRAWL 4 (1995). "Many observers see sprawl as the natural product of an inherit trait in the
American character. Peter Linneman, for instance, advances the notion that modern-day sprawl
can be traced to the historic American drive to push back the frontier and settle a vast
continent." Id.
18 See generally KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANlZATlON OF THE
UNITED STATES (1985).
19 See generally JAMES KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE
OF AMERICA'S MAN-MAnE LANDSCAPE (1993).
16
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a prophetic essay entitled The Probable Diffusion of Great Cities.20
In this essay, Wells forecast that urban regions would become so vast
that the very concept of the city would become "as obsolete as the
mailcoach.''21 From Wells' perspective, this diffusion was not altogether negative. It offered people the possibility of a healthier and
less congested life, of an alternative to the disease and filth that often
characterized turn of the century industrial cities.22
As Wells' 1900 essay suggests, initially the concept of suburbs and
suburbanization did not carry with it the cultural and environmental
stigma that it carries today. The first generation of suburbs in the
U.S., such as Philadelphia's Chestnut Hill, Chicago's Lake Forest, and
Cleveland's Shaker Heights, bore little resemblance to the suburbs of
today.23 Unlike contemporary sprawl, the first generation of suburbs
in America were equated with innovative land-use planning, highquality architecture, pedestrian access, and good suburban-urban
public transportation (usually by train).24 In fact, it was the success of
these early "garden suburbs" that created the market for, and the
allure of, suburbanization. Prior to Chestnut Hill, Lake Forest, and
Shaker Heights, the American dream, at least residentially speaking,
focused mostly on the city, the farm or, perhaps if you were rich
enough, the country estate. The garden suburbs of the early twentieth century moved the suburban ideal towards the center of the
American identity.
The tragedy is that the very characteristics that drew people to the
first generation of suburbs began to disappear as more and more
people moved out of the city.25 Suburban development began to fill in
the open space, and the high demand for housing meant that land-use
planning, quality architecture, and good suburban-urban public transportation fell by the wayside. The garden suburb gave way to the
subdivision, the shopping mall, and the freeway, and suburbanization
began to take on a new and more ominous meaning.26 Although initially envisioned as a means to escape the congestion of the city, the
20 See FISHMAN, supra note 13, at 186 (discussing Wells' essay).
21Id.
22 See id.
23 See RYBCZY"NSKI, supra note 15, at 190-97.
24 See id.
25 See V. GAIL EASLEY, AM. PLAN. AsS'N, STAYING INSIDE THE LINES: URBAN GROWTH
BOUNDARIES 1 (1992). ''The irony, of course, is that the characteristics that initially draw people
to the urban fringe disappear as more and more people come. The fringe becomes more dense
and congested, and the quality of life goes down. People look to move further away, creating
more sprawl." Id.
25 See RYBCZY"NSKI, supra note 15, at 194.
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suburbanization process eventually created its own brand of overgrowth-decentralized congestion.27 As Lewis Mumford observed in
1961, "The ultimate effect of the suburban escape in our time is,
ironically, a low-grade uniform environment from which escape is
impossible."28 Mumford continued, "A universal suburb is almost as
much a nightmare, humanly speaking, as a universal megalopolis; yet
it is toward this proliferating nonentity that our present random or
misdirected urban growth has been steadily tending."29
Lewis Mumford's critique of suburbanization was based largely on
aesthetic and cultural grounds, on the dull and prefabricated landscape it tends to create. His critique, although not at the core of my
analysis, is closely related to this Essay's central point. There are
identifiable reasons why cities traditionally have served as important
cultural centers. The reasons include the face-to-face interaction of
people from different economic classes and ethnic backgrounds, the
architectural and historical heritage of neighborhoods and city centers, and the maintenance of parks, commons, and other public spaces.
Land-use zoning, open space preservation, environmental liability,
and justice-the issues addressed in this Essay-provide the legal
framework that helps determine whether these urban amenities will
endure or decline.
With this historical context in place, we now can turn to the modern
consequences of, and responses to, the exploding metropolis. Environmentally and economically, the impact of suburbanization has been
profound. Environmentally, commercial and residential development
has now pushed deep into natural canyon, coastal, and woodland
ecosystems, with a corresponding loss of habitat for wildlife and public recreation areas for people.so The conversion of surrounding farmland to subdivisions and industrial uses has destroyed beautiful landscapes and has displaced rural communities.31 The lack of adequate
public transportation, the reliance on automobiles, and the increasing
distance of commutes have also led to severe air pollution in many
metropolitan areas.32
See FISHMAN, supra note 13, at 157.
THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS TRANSFORMATION
PROSPECTS 486 (1961).
?:1

28 LEWIS MUMFORD,

AND ITS

29 Id. at 496.
30 See BEYOND SPRAWL, supra note 11, at 8; see also MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN Los ANGELES 131 (1992).
31 See GREENBELT ALLIANCE, THE BAY AREA'S FARMLANDS 17 (1991).
3Z See generally .ANTHONY DOWNS, BROOKINGS INST., STUCK IN TRAFFIc: COPING WITH
PEAK-HoUR TRAFFIC CONGESTION (1992).
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Economically, the impacts of suburbanization have been a mixed
blessing. For the automobile and construction industries, and for the
treasuries of many suburban municipal governments, suburbanization
has been a boon.33 For city centers, however, it has been a disaster.
As businesses and residents have left for the suburbs, cities have seen
a decline in tax revenues and municipal services, and a rise in unemployment and crime.34
Although this shift in fortunes between cities and suburbs initially
seemed justified on market grounds, it has become increasingly clear
that this shift has also created new economic problems. As urban
unemployment rises, the rest of society, including those in the suburbs, are required to fund state and federal welfare assistance programs.35 As air quality declines, open space vanishes, and malls and
subdivisions come to dominate the landscape, the region becomes less
desirable vis-a.-vis other regions.36 Thus, over time, the economic welfare of the entire metropolitan area begins to suffer: the problems of
the city begin to pull the suburban economy down with it.
The economic, environmental, and political unsustainability of suburban efforts to disengage from urban cores has been recognized not
only by open space and urban poor advocates, but by the business
community as well. In 1995, Bank of America, the largest bank in
California and one of the largest banks in the United States, co-published a major report entitled Beyond Sprawl.37 In this report, Bank
of America concluded that "unchecked sprawl has shifted from an
engine of California's growth to a force that now threatens to inhibit
growth and degrade the quality of our life,"33 and that "allowing
sprawl may be politically expedient in the short run, but in the long
run will create social, environmental and political problems that we
may not be able to solve."39
Similarly, in 1991 the Bay Area Council, a policy organization representing major employers and businesses in the San Francisco re33 See

HAYWARD, supra note 12, at 10-11.
See Dean Calland, Salvaging Our Urban Broumfields, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 5, 1995,
at lIB.
35 See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 204. "But in the long run, gains for the nonpoor ml\fority
obtained at the expense of the poor minority will be outweighed by mutual losses from the
resulting weakening of the overall metropolitan and national economies. Many non poor, how·
ever, do not recognize this reality." [d.
36 See id.
If1BEYOND SPRAWL, supra note 11.
33 [d. at 1.
39 [d. at 2.
34
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gion, published a report on growth management.40 In its report, the
Bay Area Council argued that current growth patterns would lead to
"economic and environmental decay" in the area, and that new strategies were needed to protect open space.41 The report even went so far
as to suggest the creation of a Bay Area Greenbelt, a ring of undeveloped open space surrounding the entire metropolitan area.42
In response to the problems created by sprawl, local governments
and communities have developed strategies to control suburban
growth. Three of the most widely used strategies for controlling
sprawl are slow-growth initiatives, residential lot requirements, and
private land trusts.43 Slow-growth initiatives place an absolute percentage limit, or even an absolute moratorium, on the amount of new
residential units that can be built in a given time period. Residential
lot requirements establish rules regarding the size or type of new
residential construction, such as only single-family homes with a minimum amount of acreage. Private land trusts enable local citizens to
purchase open space or farmland collectively, and thereby prevent
such properties from being converted to commercial or residential
use.44
Slow-growth initiatives, residential lot requirements, and private
land trusts have helped individual communities block the development of new, less upscale, housing. However, they have not addressed
the problems that are prompting urban flight, nor have they prevented sprawl from leapfrogging over regulated slow-growth areas
to other undeveloped and less regulated areas.45 Moreover, in many
instances, local anti-sprawl measures were based more on a concern
for property values than for open space preservation.46 The environment was often only a pretense for the rich to exclude the poor and
middle classes from certain neighborhoods.47 In such situations, the

40 See generally BAY AREA COUNCIL, FOUR REASONS WHY BAY AREA BUSINESS SHOULD
PUSH FOR REGIONAL GROWTH MANAGEMENT (1991).

See id. at 2.
See id. at 3.
43 See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 31-42.
44 See generally CALIFORNIA STATE COASTAL CONSERVANCY, EVALUATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND TRUSTS (1989).
45 See id.
46 See TARLOCK, supra note 16, at 482-83. "There is, however, a less attractive side to open
space preservation. It has served to exclude poor and minorities from preexisting land uses and
to limit housing opportunities in the suburbs." Id.
47 See DAVlS, supra note 30, at 173. "Although the protracted struggle against the corporate
41

42
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economic inequities initially created by sprawl were only intensified
by local efforts to stop it.
The U.S. experience with suburbanization and open space conversion has taught environmentalists, urban poor advocates, policy makers, and the business community an important lesson. Suburbanization may provide select individuals and companies with a short-term
escape from the problems of urban decline, but it does not provide
society with a long-term policy solution. Economically and environmentally, the paradigm of the exploding metropolis, of suburbs geographically and politically segregating themselves from the city, cannot be sustained.48

II. THE

UNTOUCHABLES: BROWNFIELDS UNDER SUPERFUND

Abandoned, deteriorating property has become one of the dominant
images of our cities. It has come to represent the ghost town quality,
the so-called blight, of so many of our urban areas.49 The vision of the
vacant urban lot embodies most of the elements commonly associated
with the decline of our cities: pollution and garbage, unemployment,
poverty, racial isolation, crime, drugs, declining public services, and
architectural eyesores.50
As discussed earlier, the causes of the vacant urban lot, and of urban
decline in general, cannot be readily reduced to a single issue. While
there may have been an initial cause or trigger, we now have reached
a point where several factors are reinforcing the process of abandonment, decay, and disinvestment.51 One of the most significant factors
in this process is the liability associated with properties that are
exploitation of the mountains had injected environmental issues into city politics, the hillside
homeowners were still caricaturable as limousine conservations." ld.
48 See Bradley Inman, Greenbelts to Tighten Urban Limit Lines, S.F. EXAMINER, May 6, 1990,
at B16.
49 See URBAN VACANT LAND, supra note 6, at 15.
Vacant land is a common sight in virtually every American city. Scattered among
houses in residential areas, especially in distressed neighborhoods, small and large
vacant, trash-filled lots contribute to an appearance of deterioration and blight. Countless abandoned factories and warehouses-some with decaying buildings, others
cleared of structures but containing hazardous wastes in their soil and groundwatermar waterfronts and old industrial corridors. Derelict railroads, canals, docks, housing
projects, and landfills all add to the growing acreage of urban land left unoccupied and
untended.
ld.
60 See Stefanie B. Goldberg, Let's Make a Deal: Cooperation, Not Litigation Is the Newest
Way to Clean Up Urban Wastelands, ABA J., Mar. 1997, at 42-43.
51 See Brian C. Walsh, Seeding the Brawnjields: A Proposed Statute Limiting Environmental

1998]

ESSAY

599

perceived to be, or are in fact, contaminated with hazardous materials.52
Liability for the cleanup of contaminated property is established
primarily under federal and state environmental laws.53 The most
far-reaching of these laws is the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental
Responses, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).64 CERCLA
is often referred to as Superfund, after the revolving cleanup trust
fund established under the law. Most of the state hazardous waste
cleanup laws were based largely on the federal Superfund model.65
Therefore, by examining Superfund we can observe how environmental liability laws in general are affecting the use or abandonment
of urban properties.
The core objective of CERCLA is to identify parties responsible
for contaminating property, and then to require these parties to pay,
or reimburse the government, usually the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), directly for the costs of environmental remediation.56
CERCLA refers to persons who are subject to remediation liability
as potentially responsible parties (PRPs). On its face, CERCLA appears to be a workable and appropriate piece oflegislation; a straightforward law based on the polluter pays principle, which holds that the
burden of cleanup should fall on the shoulders of those who pollute.57
In practice, however, CERCLA has proven difficult and somewhat
dysfunctional,68
CERCLNs troubles can be traced in part to the expansive interpretations of the term PRP, and PRP remediation liability, adopted
by EPA and the COurtS.59 These expansive interpretations resulted in
the following liability rules: (1) strict liability, in which intent or
Liability for Prospective Purchasers, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 198 (1997). "Looming environmental liability is not the only factor contributing to the brownfields problem; other significant
factors include perceptions of crime, tax rates, municipal services, and possibly racism." Id.
53 See Ravi Arulanantham & Steven Morse, Brvwnfields .•. Everybody's Doing It, 5 ENV'T
L. NEWS 1, 5-6 (1996).
63 See BoYD ET AL., supra note 9, at 7-8.
&142 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
65 See Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brvwnfields to Save Greenfields: Shifting the Environmental Risks of Acquiring and Reusing Contaminated Land, 27 CONN. L. REV. 789, 790-91
(1995) (referring to state hazardous waste liability laws as ''little CERCLAs").
66 See Charles de Saillan, In Praise of Superfund, 35 ENV'T 42, 42 (1993).
57 See DAVID PEARCE & R. KERRY TuRNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 173,175 (1990).
63 See Senator John H. Chafee, Superfund Reform: Use Brvwnfields to Save Green Ones,
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., July 2, 1996, at E04.
69 See Walsh, supra note 51, at 194.
>
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negligence were not required to impose remediation liability on a
PRP;60 (2) joint and several liability, in which a party who contributed
a small portion of the pollution could be responsible for the entire cost
ofremediation;61 (3) lender liability, in which banks and lending institutions that influenced the management decisions of property owners
could be subject to PRP liability;62 (4) retroactive liability, in which a
party could be subject to PRP liability notwithstanding that its hazardous waste disposal practices were legal at the time the disposal
occurred;63 and (5) open-ended liability, in which a party was uncertain as to when remediation was completed, or what cleanup standards would satisfy its remediation responsibilities.54
Although CERCLNs expansive liability rules were intended to
facilitate comprehensive and speedy cleanup of contaminated sites,
often this was not the result. Frequently, the liability for PRPs was
so extensive that parties found it cheaper to litigate for years rather
than to pay for remediation.55 Frequently, the specter of lender liability meant that banks would refuse to foreclose on loans, and properties would be abandoned.56 Frequently, investors and banks would
60 See DAVID CARPENTER, ROBERT CUSHMAN & BRUCE ROZONOWSKI, ENvmONMENTAL
DISPUTE HANDBOOK: LIABILITY AND CLAIMS 31-82 (1991). "[CERCLA] imposed strict liability,
without regard to fault, on certain broadly defined categories of persons who either owned or
operated the sites that became the subject of government removal or remedial action, or who
either generated or transported the hazardous substances that were disposed of in these sites."

Id.
61

See CARPENTER, CUSHMAN & ROZONOWSKI, supra note 60, at 189 (Volume II).

Early case law under CERCLA established that joint and several liability, even though
not expressly authorized by the statute, could be imposed on the four types of PRPs.
Under joint and several liability, each defendant is liable for the entire harm, not just
the harm for which it is proximately responsible.
Id.
62 See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding
that lenders could be held liable for environmentallhazardous waste remediation if they participated sufficiently in a company's management). EPA issued a regulation that sought to limit the
Fleet Factors holding, but this regulation was found to be inconsistent with CERCLA's liability
scheme. See Kelley v. Environmental Protection Agency, 15 F.3d 1107, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
63 See CARPENTER, CUSHMAN & ROZONOWSKI, supra note 60, at 356. "[CERCLA] is unprecedented, in that liability for environmental cleanup is being mandated for businesses even when
prior handling and disposal activities were conducted using methods which constituted perfectly
acceptable practices within the legal and regulatory framework of those times •••• The retroactivity implication of Superfund have cast a cloud of uncertainty over business conduct within
the private sector of the U.S. economy." Id. See also United States v. Northeastern Pharm. &
Chern. Co. Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 732-84 (8th Cir. 1986).
64 See BoYD ET AL., supra note 9, at 10. See generally Frederick W. Addison, Reopener
Liability Under SectWn 122 of CERCLA: "From Here to Eternity," 45 Sw. L.J. 1081 (1991).
65 See Superfund as a Threat, ENVTL. F. July-Aug. 1994, at 15.
G6 See generally Scott Wlisdon, Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against
Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HAsTINGS L.J. 1261 (1987).
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refuse to redevelop contaminated property, or even property that
might be contaminated, for fear of becoming a PRP.67 Frequently,
landowners would avoid undertaking a preliminary environmental
assessment of their property, because such an assessment could unearth information that might trigger PRP liability.68
Under the above liability scenario, environmental lawyers and remediation consultants made substantial profits. Despite the enormous
activity surrounding CERCLNs implementation, however, there
often was a disturbing lack of activity on the actual remediation
front. 69 Lawyers and consultants were hired to help determine CERCLA remediation liability, but much of their work never translated
into tangible cleanup of contaminated properties.70
The subject matter of CERCLA, the polluted sites, generally remained just that-polluted sites. Especially in former industrial urban areas, the American landscape remained littered with abandoned,
contaminated properties.71 Although CERCLA environmentalliability certainly was not the only factor contributing to this situation, it
nonetheless helped to deepen the post-industrial economic decline in
many city neighborhoods.72 From an investment and business standpoint, these abandoned properties, or brownfields, became untouchables.
Abandoned brownftelds tended to drag surrounding properties and
communities down with them, thereby reinforcing the decline cycle.73
IJ1 See Charles Bartsch, Financing Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment, NE-MW ECON.
REV., June 1995, at 4.
68 BoYD ET AL., supra note 9, at 25.
For this reason, it may be in the interest of those who currently own brownfields
properties to withhold them from the market. The increased probability of detection
that accompanies a sale in effect imposes the property transfer tax that can lead to
deadweight losses in brownfield property markets. This distortion underlies the following type of complaint, made in arguments for a recent environmental liability
reform initiative in the Pennsylvania Senate: "Companies in Pittsburgh, Johnstown
and other communities have deliberately let industrial property stand idle indefinitely
rather than even look to see what contamination might exist because they were afraid
to deal with state environmental agencies."
Id. (quoting Clean Up Pollution, Protect Farmland, Create Jobs: How a Sensible Industrial
Site Recycling Policy Will Benefit Pennsylvania (PRESS RELEASE, PENNSYLVANIA SENATORS
BRIGHTBILL, MUSTO, STEWART, AND SHAFFER), Apr. 1, 1993».
69 See Superfund as a Threat, supra note 65, at 15. EPA "now spends only about 45 percent
of its Superfund monies on core activities, such as waste removal and remedication. The rest
goes for administrative oversight, studies, design, investigation, monitoring, enforcement, and
legal costs!' ENV'T WK., July 21, 1997, at 345.
70 See ENV'T WK., supra note 69, at 345-46.
71 See URBAN VACANT LAND, supra note 6, at 15.
'12 See id. at 57.
'12 See, e.g., John Carey, Urban Fields of Dreams, Bus. WK., May 27, 1996, at 80-86. See also

602

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

[Vol. 25:589

As discussed earlier in this Essay, the increase in untouchable
brownfields also encouraged suburban sprawl and the destruction of
open space.74 This pattern of metropolitan expansion only further
diminished the economic resources and political power of many cities.
The point here is not to blame CERCLA for the woes of post-industrial urban America. Rather, the point is simply to demonstrate
the particular role that environmental liability rules played in diverting investment and economic development away from our cities.
In response to the economic and environmental problems relating
to PRP liability rules, there have been some attempts to reform
CERCLA. The first significant attempt to reform CERCLA was the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986.76
Among other things, SARA sought to establish a viable lIinnocent
landowner defense" for parties who purchased real property after
contamination occurred.76 Under SARA's provisions, a purchaser
would not be liable for remediation costs if the party could demonstrate that it lldid not know nor had reason to know" of the hazardous
waste contamination when the party acquired the property.77 The
objective of this language was to provide the prospective purchaser
with sufficient protection, or immunity, so that polluted properties
could be redeveloped.
Due to inconsistent interpretations of the innocent landowner defense, however, SARA did not achieve this goal. More specifically,
EPA and the courts did not clearly establish what the prospective
purchaser must do, in terms in environmental investigation, to demonstrate that it lldid not know nor had reason to know" of existing
contamination.78 In the absence of such specific criteria, SARA's protections could not be relied upon. As one commentator explained, in
KARL LINN, URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, FROM RUBBLE TO RESTORATION 2 (1994). "The loss
of an economic base has left many cities with extensive areas of unused land. Acre upon acre of
vacant litter strewn land symbolizes many cities as places of desolation and decay in the minds
of residents and visitors alike." ld. at 2.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 11-48.
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1994).
76 The origins of CERCLNs innocent landowner defense can be traced to 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(3), which establishes a third party defense. SARA sought to clarify and expand this
third party defense.
77 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1994).
78 See generally Phillip B. Rarick, The Superfund Due Diligence Problems: The Flaws in the
ASTM Proposal and an Alternative Approach, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10505 (1991); see also In Re
Hemingway 'Iransp., 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., 788 F. Supp; 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. Serafini, 791 F. Supp. 107 (M.D.
Pa. 1990); United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989);
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practice CERCLNs innocent landowner defense turned out to be
more of a mirage than an oasis.79 As a result, acquisition and redevelopment of polluted properties did not occur, and the untouchables
remained largely untouched.
The second major wave of CERCLA reform, EPNs Brownfields
Action Agenda (EPA Agenda), began near the end of President Clinton's first term.SO The EPA Agenda emerged from the ashes of the
proposed 1994 Superfund Reform Act (SRA), a Clinton-sponsored bill
which Congress did not pass. In the absence of strong congressional
action, the focus of CERCLA reform shifted to the administrative
arena.81 What could not be achieved through broad-based legislation
would now be attempted through a package of agency policies and
operating procedures.52
Prior to the EPA Agenda, the terril brownfield generally -held a
negative meaning, both environmentally and investment-wise. It referred to former industrial properties that were now unused due
to uncertainty over environmental remediaton liability.83 EPNs program sought to transform this meaning, to change the language of
brownfields from talk of obstacles to talk of opportunity. An April
1996 report issued by EPA reflects this shift: "Implementation of the
Brownfields Action Agenda will help reverse the spiral of unaddressed contamination, declining property values and increased unemployment often found in inner city industrial areas."M As such, the
Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529 CW.D. Wash. 1988); BCW Assocs. v. Occidental
Chern. Corp., 1988 WL 102641 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
79 See generally L. Jager Smith, CERCLA's Innocent Landmvner Defense: Oasis qr Mirage?,
18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 155 (1993).
80 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE BROWNFIELDS ACTION AGENDA 1 (Apr.
1996) [hereinafter EPA AGENDA].
81 See William Keener, Brawnjields-The United States EPA's Policy and Legal Responses,
LAND-USE AND ENV'T F., at 144-45 (Summer 1995). As EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C.
"struggled to respond individually to each of these requests, it pinned its hopes on the Clinton
Administration's 1994 Superfund Reform Act (SRA) ••• [al]though the bill failed to pass in the
last week of the 103rd Congress." Id. at 144. "In the wake of SRA's demise, the EPA is not
sitting still, waiting for a new version of SRA to hit the President's desk. The EPA is pushing
ahead with its own program to implement some of that taken from SRA. Known as the
'CERCLA administrative reform,' they include a package of policies that encourages economic
development of real estate under the umbrella of the EPA's brownfields action agenda." Id. at
145.
82 See id.
83 See Tondro, supra note 55, at 789-90. Terry T. Tondro defines brownfields as "productive
property now unused due to uncertainty over who bears the responsibility for undertaking
environmental cleanup." Id.
8-\ EPA AGENDA, supra note 80, at 1.
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EPA Agenda suggested that the brownfields issue was not just about
limiting the liability of banks and real estate developers; it was also
about providing inner-city residents with a strategy to improve the
economy and environmental health of their communities.55
In terms of CERCLA implementation, the EPA Agenda called for
several changes in agency policy and operating procedures. These
changes included, among other things, (1) CERCLIS delisting, in
which EPA removed over 25,000 properties from the national tracking list of contaminated sites;55 (2) prospective purchaser agreements,
in which EPA agreed not to sue new owners for environmental remediation costs for contamination that occurred prior to purchase;B7 (3)
comfort letters, in which EPA set forth its remediation goals regarding formerly federally owned property;88 (4) land-use restrictions, in
which new owners agreed to limit future use to commercial and industrial purposes in exchange for EP.Ns release of remediation liability; (5) national and regional brown.fields pilots, in which EPA provided grants to states and local governments to help promote
environmental cleanup and redevelopment of contaminated properties;89 and (6) Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) credits, in which
federal guidelines were changed to permit banks to fulfill CR.Ns 10eal-Iending obligations by providing loans for environmental remediation and brownfields redevelopment.9o
In addition to the EPA Agenda's administrative reforms, Congress
recently passed legislation that could provide further liability protections for banks and other lending institutions. The 1996 Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act
(part of the Omnibus Appropriations Act), signed into law by Presi85 See URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, supra note 7, at 1-2. ''While the EPA initiative has put
brownfields redevelopment on the agenda of almost every government entity, developing n
coordinated approach to urban revitalization that places inner city-based community groups on
the same footing as private and public initiatives is crucial ••. •" [d.
86 CERCLIS is short for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation &
Liability Information System, the EPA databasefmventory of potential hazardous waste sites.
See EPA AGENDA, supra note 80, at 5. See also Elizabeth M. Weaver, New Life for BrOluufields:
Contaminated Sites Can Be Successfully Redeveloped, HOUSE COUNSEL MAG., Winter 1997, at
25.
.
f{1 See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, LIABILITY AND OTHER GUIDANCES 1 (Mar. 1996).
88 See EPA AGENDA, supra note 80, at 7 (discussing Model Comfort Letter for 'fransfers of
Federally Owned Property).
89 See generally OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS NATIONAL PILOTS (June 1996) [hereinafter CRA Credits].
90 See
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dent Clinton on September 20, 1996, creates a new ''lender exemption" under CERCLA.91 This exemption permits a bank or lender to
take certain specified actions to protect its security interest in a
contaminated property without triggering Superfund's PRP liability.
These exempt actions include foreclosure, resale and leasing of the
premises.92 Although there still remain many pre-foreclosure actions
that could trigger PRP liability, especially lender actions that might
influence how a landowner manages environmental problems on a
given site, the federal legislation does provide greater clarity and
certainty. At least in regard to the actions specifically exempted,
banks and other lending institutions should be better able to determine their potential remediation liability.93
As discussed earlier, CERCLA is not the only law that creates
liability for the cleanup of contaminated properties. There are laws in
virtually every state that establish CERCLA-type liability schemes
for environmental remediation.94 The policy debates around brownfields reclamation therefore have focused not only on CERCLA, but
on state hazardous waste laws as well.95

III.

ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: RECLAMATION
FOR WHOM?

As the previous sections on open space conversion and brownfields
reveal, metropolitan land-use and hazardous waste remediation are
closely linked to the fate of the urban poor. Because the urban poor
often tend to be people of color, frequently African-American or Latino citizens, these issues also raise difficult questions of equity and
justice. How does the location of contaminated sites, and the rules
governing environmental liability, impact the economic and health
conditions in communities of color? Do the negative economic and environmental consequences of open space conversion affect all ethnic
groups equally? Will brownfields reclamation provide tangible
benefits, in terms of economic development or environmental quality,
91 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)-(G) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n) (1994).
9242 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)(ii).
93

See Maurine C. Padden, Toxic Liability Reformfar Lenders and Fiduciaries, 15 CAL. REAL

PROP. J. 15, 25 (1997).
9-1 See BoYD ET AL., supra note 9, at 7-8. "Superfund is only one element of a greater
patchwork of legal rules and regulations that can create uncertain liability for property owners.••• Property owners who are not liable under CERCLA may nevertheless be liable under
state law." Id.
as See id.
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for the communities where brownfields are located, or will reclamation mostly benefit investors from outside the communities?
The questions presented above all fall within the larger policy issue
of what is now generally called "environmental justice."nG The environmental justice movement is based on the growing recognition that
poor communities and minority populations are subject to disproportionately high health and environmental risks. 97 Government policies
that have either encouraged or ignored this disproportionate allocation of risks have been classified justifiably as examples of environmental racism. 98 The goal of the environmental justice movement is
to ensure that environmental protection policies benefit all citizens,
not just the white and the rich, by empowering disadvantaged communities and educating and pressuring government agencies.99
From both a racial and an environmental standpoint, environmental
justice is a significant, and arguably a long-overdue, development. The
movement represents the convergence of two agendas that traditionally had little interest in or understanding of each other-civil rights
and environmental protection.lOo More specifically, it forced the environmental movement to confront some of the racist and class-driven
aspects of its political platform. Environmentalists had come to consider environmental protection as something distinct from, or something above, the struggle for justice and equity.10l By demonstrating
that levels of environmental protection were closely related to citi-

96 See generally William A. Shutkin & Charles P. Lord, Environmental Law, Environmental
Justice and Democracy, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1117 (1994).
9'1 See Ann Bastian & Dana Alston, Writing Our Own History: New Developments in the
Environmental Justice Movement, 5 RACE, POVERTY & THE ENV'T 8, 8 (1994-1995). "Environmental justice struggles have been around a long time, but they only gained self-consciousness
and recognition as a movement over the last few years. Broadly defined, this movement links
grassroots activism around environmental protection to issues of economic development, social
equality and community empowerment." Idj see also Thmas Aragon & Kevin Grumbach, Bayview Hunters Point Community Health and Environment Check Up (May 17,1997) (documenting different health risks in predominantly white versus predominantly minority neighborhoods
in San Francisco).
98 See Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor and Poisoned: Minority Grassroots
Environmentalists and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 RAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 69, 69 (1991).
99 See Preamble, in Principles of Environmental Justice (adopted at the First National People
of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Washington, D.C., Oct. 1991).
100 See generally Alice L. Brown, Environmental Justice and Civil Rights, 5 RACE, POVERTY
& THE ENV'T 39 (1994-1995).
101 For a comprehensive discussion of the environmental movement's failure to respond to
issues of equity and racism see MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENvmONMENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF THE TwENTIETH CENTURY (1995).
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zens' race and wealth, environmental justice advocates laid bare the
falsity of this position.102
By the time EPA began developing its Brownfields Action Agenda,
the environmental justice movement was already in high gear. For
several years, disadvantaged communities had begun to organize
around health and environmental issues, and had managed to force
changes in government and corporate policy.l03 Several successful
environmental justice lawsuits and administrative challenges had
been filed. 104 Additionally, President Clinton took two actions that
helped raise the political profile of the movement. First, on September
30, 1993, he established the National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council (NEJAC) to provide independent advice, consultations, and
recommendations to the EPA Administrator on environmental justice
matters.1OS Second, on February 11, 1994, President Clinton issued
Executive Order 12,898, entitled Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income Populations.10G
Given these developments in the area of environmental justice, the
push for brownfields reclamation was met with both anticipation and
skepticism. On the one hand, brownfields reclamation provided an
opportunity to clean up and improve economic and environmental

102 See

Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21,

1992, at S2.
103 See generally Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Needfor Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992) (explaining why real action,

and real successes, in environmental justice happen at community level, not in courtroom
because filing suit is often an indication of failure at community organizing level).
IGI See Luke Cole, Lawyers, the Law & Environmental Justice: Dangers for the Movement, 5
RACE, POVERTY & THE ENV'T 3, 3 (1994-1995).
Community groups, environmental and civil rights organizations, and private attorneys have filed dozens of lawsuits in community struggles for environmental justice in
the last five years. Some of these lawsuits have been suits using environmental law,
some have been straight up civil rights suits, some have been interesting blends of
these two disciplines •••• Many of these suits have been successful, and the legal piece
to the environmental justice movement is becoming every more sophisticated•••• The
legal struggle has moved beyond the courtroom, as well. More than 20 administrative
complaints under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging environmental
racism, have been filed with U.S. EPA in the past 15 months, with more being filed
each month.
[d.
105 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE,
THE MODEL PLAN FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION ii (Nov. 1996).
106 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994).
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conditions in many poor and minority neighborhoods. 107 On the other
hand, brownfields reclamation also called for less stringent cleanup
standards and shielding banks and investors from remediation liability.lOS Furthermore, there were no guarantees that the new jobs made
possible by reclamation would go to the people who lived in the
communities where brownfields were located. 109 Thus, it was possible
that brownfields reclamation could lead to a continuation or worsening
of health and economic conditions in poor and minority neighborhoods.
Skepticism about brownfields reclamation was based on more than
environmental justice concerns. It was based on the negative experiences of many communities with urban renewal policies. During the
1960s, state and federal governments implemented many programs
aimed at improving housing and economic development in inner cities,11° On the whole, these programs failed to achieve their goals.111
The housing projects often tended to isolate and stigmatize poor,
minority populations, and thus led to increased segregation and
crime. l12 The renovation of older neighborhoods often resulted in gentrification, in which neighborhood residents were priced out of their
own communities.11s The economic development programs often focused on businesses that, for reasons of both racism and work skills,
did not hire from the community.1l4 Thus, the jobs that were created
did not benefit inner-city residents. As one observer put it, "urban
renewal means negro removal."115
Many suspected that the 1990s brownfields agenda would be a
repeat of the 1960s urban renewal experience. Olin Webb, a construc107 See

Goldberg, supra note 50, at 42.
Tondro, supra note 55, at 801 ("Differential clean-up standards, if set at a lower level
than some 'ideal' standard, can readily be characterized as continuing this discrinlination against
poor and minority communities, shifting to them part of the costs of cleaning up Brownflelds
lOS See

... .'').

109 See Alan Edson, Presentation at the Conference on Community Development and Environmental Restoration: The Language and Practice of Brownfields Redevelopment in San
Francisco (May 10, 1997). ("Local Communities are concerned that the brownfields movement
is really about a 'one shot deal,' where minority populations are given jobs to build businesses
and housing, and not the jobs to work or live there.")
110 See RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 15, at 172.
m See generally MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF URBAN RENEWAL, 1949-1962 (1964).
112 See id.
113 See Tarlock, supra note 16, at 481.
114 Interview with Alan Edson of the African American Development Association and Olin
Webb of the Bayview-Hunters Point Contractors Association (conducted Feb. 10, 1997).
115 See Editorial, Bringing New Life to a Troubled Area, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 29, 1994, at AlB.
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tion engineer and long-time resident of the Bayview-Hunters Point
neighborhood in San Francisco, expressed these concerns poignantly.
Bayview-Hunters Point contains numerous contaminated and abandoned properties, and a majority of its residents are minorities.us The
neighborhood has therefore been a focal point for government and
private sector brownfield initiatives in the San Francisco Bay Area.
Many of these initiatives have been portrayed by government and
investors as community redevelopment projects. Mr. Webb, however,
views these initiatives as part of a longer and more disturbing pattern:
As far as I'm concerned, a brownfield is just a Superfund site.
African-Americans bore the brunt of the poison and pollution
when they were Superfund sites, but now they are not going to
be a part of cleanup and redevelopment. From my neighborhood's
perspective, brownfields redevelopment means that AfricanAmericans are being passed over and moved out.1l7

As discussed in the previous section on CERCLA reform efforts,
EPA began developing its Brownfields Action Agenda in early 1995,
after Congress failed to pass the 1994 Superfund Reform Act.llS By
early 1995, the environmental justice movement had become a powerful political force, and President Clinton had issued his 1994 Executive Order on Environmental Justice.l19 Thus, at least at the level of
government policy, environmental justice and brownfields reclamation became major political priorities at a similar point in time.
The concurrent political ascendance of environmental justice and
brownfield issues forced the Clinton Administration to develop new
strategies to handle this emerging policy nexus. In terms of a bestcase scenario, the Clinton Administration sought to stitch the two
movements together-to integrate equity, environmental cleanup,
and economic revitalization into one coherent and mutually reinforcing policy agenda. In terms of damage control, the Clinton Administration wanted to avoid a situation where the environmental justice
and brownfields agendas were in visible contradiction, mutually undermining each other.
116 See Jane Kay, Pollution Fears Stir Activists in Hunters Point, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 26,
1996, at AI; see also Clifford Rechtschaffen, Fighting Back Against a Power Plant: SCYme
Lessons From the Legal and Organizing Effarts olthe Bayview-Hunters Point Community, 3
HAsTINGS W. N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 407, 408 (1996).
117 Edson and Webb Interview, supra note 114.
118 See supra text accompanying notes 80-S2.
119 See supra text accompanying note 106.
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The Clinton Administration's first significant effort to integrate
environmental justice and brownfields policies took place in the context of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Committee
(NEJAC), created in 1993 to advise EPA.120 In 1995, NEJAC's Waste
and Facility Siting Subcommittee and EPA cosponsored a series of
public dialogues entitled Public Dialogues on Urban Revitalization
and Brownfields: Envisioning Healthy and Sustainable Communities. 121 The dialogues were held in five cities (Boston, Philadelphia,
Detroit, Oakland, and Atlanta) and were intended to provide a forum
to discuss EPRs plans to adopt new administrative policies to help
encourage the redevelopment of contaminated urban properties.l22
NEJAC's public dialogues involved persons from varied backgrounds
and with varied objectives. Among those who participated were representatives from community groups, government agencies, religious
groups, unions, universities, banks, and philanthropies. l23
Although the NEJAC dialogues revealed that there was broad
interest in the issue of brownfields, they also revealed the profound
gulf in both objectives and language that existed between different
stakeholders.124 Every participant in the NEHAC dialogues used the
word "redevelopment," but the term clearly meant different things to
different people. For the real estate investors and banks, redevelopment meant removing the liability risks associated with property
transactions at sites where there were toxic contamination concerns.125 For environmental justice advocates, redevelopment meant
ensuring that health conditions and the economic self-reliance of poor,
inner-city residents were improved, not worsened, by brownfields
reclamation.126

a discussion of NEJAC, see supra text accompanying note 105.
See URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, URBAN REVITALIZATION,
AND BROWNFlELDS: THE SEARCH FOR AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE 1 (1995).
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See id.
Concerns were raised [at the NEJAC dialogues] by members orthe public about the
Brownfields Initiative, ie., whether or not the brownfields issue was a smoke screen
for gutting cleanup standards, environmental regulations, and liability safeguards.
Heretofore, public policy discourse around the brownfields issue has revolved around
removing barriers to real estate and investment transactions at sites where there
exists toxic contamination concerns-real or perceived.
URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, supra note 121, at 1.
126 See id. at ii ''Environmental justice and brownfields are inextricably linked. All stakeholder
120 For

121
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The divisions that emerged at the 1995 NEJAC dialogues have
continued to define the evolution of the brownfields issue. In the San
Francisco Bay Area, for instance, many of the local participants hi the
Oakland NEJAC dialogue went on to form the San Francisco"Bay
Area Regional Brownfields Working Group (SF Brownfields WorKing
Group).127 Although the group includes members from the lending,
business, and regulatory communities, the main foci of the group's
work are to promote environmental justice in the context of the
brownfields issue, and to strengthen community leadership and participation in efforts to redevelop contaminated properties.128•• r
To help advance these environmental justice goals, iIi May 6f 1997
the SF Brownfields Working Group organized a workshop entitled
Community Development & Environmental Restoration: The Language & Practice of Brownfields Redevelopment. Unlike the 1995
NEJAC dialogues, the SF Brownfields Working Group workshop was
not designed to help EPA formulate new hazardous ~ast~'remedia
tion policies. Rather, the goal of the 1997 workshop was to educate
community leaders on existing government policies and lending/financing options in the brownfields area.129 It provided information on how local non-profits and small businesses can take the lead,
and leverage resources, to clean up sites and put them back into
productive use. As such, the focus of the workshop was on helping
neighborhoods become the initiators, rather than the ,victims, of
brownfields reclamation.
At the same time as groups like the SF Brownfields Woi-king Group
are pushing ahead on the environmental justice front,..- other stakeholders are seeking to frame the brownfields issues in ;terms of pure
investment opportunities. For instance, in March of 1'997, a new national magazine, Brownfield News, was launched in Cl:ficago. The magazine proclaims itself to be ''The Source of the Distressed Property
groups must recognize that the inescapable context for discussi~~. of the brownfields issue is
environmental justice and urban revitalization." [d.
.l
127 The author is a member of the San Francisco Bay Area Brownfields Working Group, and
therefore the discussion that follows is based largely on the author'~•.experience with the group.
128 See URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY .AREA REGIONAL
BROWNFIELDS WORKING GROUP: REDEVELOPMENT GoALS, PRINCIPLES AND ACTIVITIES TO
DATE 1 (1996).
129

See Ccnnmunity DeveWpment & Environmental Restorationi A Workshop on the Lan-

guage & Practice of Brownjields Redevelopment (1997) (mailing flyer from the San Francisco
Bay Area Brownfields Working Group) (on file with author). ''The \Vorkshop will focus on ways
in which community leaders and community groups can capture'the resources necessary to
move a brownfields redevelopment project forward." [d.
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Market," and contains articles on industrial real estate forecasts, investor insurance coverage, strategies to reduce expenditures on environmental cleanup, and new legislative proposals to reduce investor
and lender liability.lso In the pages of Brownfield News, one is not
likely to find discussion of economic equity, public participation, or
environmental racism. These issues simply fall outside the investment
scope of the pUblication.
The point here is not to portray the SF Brownfields Working Group
and Brownfield News as two opposite ends on a spectrum of good and
evil. Clearly, environmental justice advocates need to access and leverage private capital to achieve their community empowerment
goals. lSI Local non profits and government agencies can take the lead
in defining how neighborhood redevelopment should proceed, but only
the private sector can provide the financial resources to make these
plans work. l32 Given that the private sector will be the ultimate engine
of brownfields reclamation, much of the information presented in
Brownfield News could be used to further the environmental justice
agenda. It could be viewed as a tool for helping communities take
control of their economic and environmental future.
Despite the potential confluence of interests, however, environmental justice advocates remain wary of the lending and investment
communities' growing role in brownfields redevelopment.l33 As with
urban renewal in the 1960s, there is concern that the brownfields issue
is being economically and politically hijacked by interests that have
no connection with, or true concern about, the communities they claim
to be helping. In the language of investors and lenders, struggling
communities and poisoned citizens can be readily reduced to the term
"distressed property market," a market in which profit alone becomes
the governing redevelopment principle.1M
In the brownfields debate, environmental justice advocates have
posed a critical question: Can there be a commitment to urban neighborhoods, economic equity, and public health when remediation policy

130 See

generally BROWNFIELD NEWS, Mar. 1997, at 1.
See Edson and Webb Interview, supra note 114.
182 See ide
133 See 'Thndro, supra note 55, at 801 ("The rapidly developing concern for environmentnl
equity is the wild card in any effort to cut the costs of remediating contaminated land.").
131 See Evan C. Henry & Randy A. Mueller, Banking on Properties: Brownfields FinancingFinancial Institution Consideration/or the Private Sector, BROWNFIELD NEWS, May 1997, at
20 ("[IJn the financial community's language there are only two words: dollars and cents.").
131
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and investment are driven by profit alone?l35 The answer to this
question will impact citizens and communities across the nation.

IV.

BEYOND THE NEXUS: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM

The origins of suburban sprawl, toxic contamination, and inner-city
decline are complex. Given this complexity, there are no simple policy
solutions to these problems. The scope and interrelatedness of the
issues do not lend themselves to tidy, reductionist answers.
While there may not be simple solutions, there are nonetheless
specific and important policy steps that can be taken to improve the
situation. particularly in the areas of metropolitan land governance
and the remediation regulatory framework, there are policy options
that can and should be pursued.
In the area of metropolitan land governance, there needs to be a
recognition that our municipal governments often lack the legal capacity to deal with the problems facing our cities.lss Jurisdiction over
land regulation generally exists at the county level, yet the problems
of open space loss and inner-city disinvestment frequently operate on
a larger metropolitan scale.137 As long as land-use planning, property
taxes, and municipal services are handled by county governments,
different counties will lack either the means or the incentive to deal
with metropolitan-wide land-use problems.lss
Illustrations of the inadequacy of current metropolitan governance
are easy enough to find. A county that chooses to protect open space
generally cannot prevent a neighboring county from encouragingURBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, supra note 7, at 1-2.
The environmental justice movement has been instrumental in focusing brownfields
issues to address economic development and urban revitalization as central to the
nation's economic and environmental future. By placing the intersection of race and
environmental degradation at the center of the agenda of environmental protection,
brownfields redevelopment has the potential to address the social, economic and-environmental needs of multicultural urban communities in tandem with the regional needs
for land use reform.

135 See

[d.
136 See Myron Orfie1d, Metropolitics: Coalitions far Regional Reform, BROOKINGS REV., Winter 1997, at 8.
137 See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 31. ''Each jurisdiction tends to adopt policies designed to
benefit its own residents and disregards their effects on the rest of the metropolitan area. This
parochial viewpoint causes serious discrepancies between the welfare of individual communities
and that of the entire metropolitan area." [d.
133 See URBAN VACANT LAND, supra note 6, at 65. "Those interested in the root cause of urban
abandonment should look beyond the limits of the central city and seek ways to engage in
region-wide planning efforts that transcend jurisdictional boundaries." [d.
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sprawl, and adding to traffic and air pollution.139 Inner-city counties
containing large numbers of contaminated properties cannot require
that surrounding suburban counties help fund remediation. In many
metropolitan areas, there is no way to ensure the availability of affordable housing to middle and lower income residents, because each
county is seeking to upgrade its tax base,140
The inadequacy of metropolitan governance is particularly acute in
the land-use area. As Joe Bodovitz of California Environmental Trust,
a non-governmental organization focused on growth-management issues, observed:
Sustainable environmental planning comes down to three basic
elements: land, air and water. In the Bay Area, the Regional
Water Quality Control Board has the region-wide institutional
capacity to deal with water quality and the nine-county Bay Area
Air Quality Management District has the institutional capacity to
deal with air quality. The problem is that there is no region-wide
institution with the capacity to adequately deal with land, and
without the land element, the environmental quality of the Bay
Area cannot be preserved.141

In 1991, state legislation was introduced in California that would
have helped establish the foundation for meaningful metropolitan
governance in the San Francisco Bay Area. The proposed legislation
called for the consolidation of three existing regional institutions and
agencies, the Association of Bay Area Governments, the Bay Area
Air Quality Management District, and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, into one governmental entity called the Regional
Commission.l42 Proponents of the Regional Commission legislation
also envisioned that two other regional bodies, the Regional Water
Quality Control Board and the Bay Conservation and Development
Commission, could later be integrated into the new comprehensive
metropolitan entity.143

BAY AREA COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 2.
id.
141 Interview with Joe Bodovitz (conducted Mar. 7, 1997).
142 See S. 797, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1991).
143 See BAY VISION 2020 COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 16 (1991).
The merger would link, in one agency with one governing board, responsibility for
regional air quality, regional transportation, and regional aspects of land use; it would
also make possible effective planning and actions for other, related matters•••• Other
regional agencies should be considered for later consolidation into the new Regional
Commission. These could include the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality
139 See
140 See
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Despite the support· of the environmental, minority rights, and
affordable housing advocates, the bill creating the Regional Commission was rejected by the California legislature. This rejection was due
in large part to two factors. First, some existing agencies proved
unwilling to transfer authority or funding to the new Regional Commission.l44 Second, many less populated Bay Area suburban communities were convinced that the Regional Commission's agenda would
be dominated by urban interests.145
Although recent efforts to strengthen metropolitan-wide governance did not succeed in the San Francisco Bay Area, other cities have
had better luck. In 1978, for instance, Portland, Oregon voters approved the creation of a new multi-county agency, the Metropolitan
Services Agency, with significant land-use authority.146 The Metropolitan Services Agency, or ''Tri-Met,'' whose councilors are elected from
the city's three counties, has jurisdiction over development, housing,
and open space preservation for the entire Portland metropolitan
area.147 Portland's multi-county agency has been credited with preventing the sprawl, traffic congestion, and affordable housing shortages that have plagued many other cities.l48
While an agency like Tri-Met may not be the appropriate solution
for all cities, Portland has at least provided an important model for
metropolitan governance. The citizens of Portland have demonstrated
that it is indeed politically possible to create metropolitan institutions
that operate at the same scale as the land-use problems confronting
our cities.149
In the area of brownfields remediation policy, the critical task will
be to place environmental and economic justice issues at the center
of the redevelopment process. Through the federal EPA Brownfields
Action Agenda, and similar state environmental reforms, the liability
Control Board, the Bay Conservation and Development Commission, and other singlepurpose agencies acting on issues of regional concern.

Id.
See Bodovitz Interview, supra note 141.
id.
146 See John King, Portland's Metro Government Role, Power Still Being Defined, CONTRA
COSTA TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1990, at 1A.
147 See id. at 9A.
148 See generally Charles A. Hales, Higher Density Plus Certainty Equals Affordable Housing for Portland, URB. LAND, Sept. 1991, at 12-15.
149 See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 182. ''Unless Americans confront this reality by creating
institutions that operate at the same scale as their major problems, their problems will only get
worse." Id.
144

145 See

616

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

[Vol. 25:589

framework for contaminated properties is beginning to change. l60
State and federal laws and regulations increasingly offer enhanced
protection to investors who are willing to purchase sites with real or
perceived hazardous waste problems.l6l While these investors will
likely help put brownfields back into economic use, it remains unclear
what impact this redevelopment will have on inner-city communities
and the environment.
State and federal governments can play an important role in shaping the redevelopment process. Most significantly, governments can
provide a regulatory framework that will point the private sector, the
underlying engine of brownfields redevelopment, in a more environmentally progressive and equitable direction. l52 Governments can refuse to accept lower cleanup and health standards for properties
located in poor inner-city neighborhoods. They can develop more
powerful tax incentives, along the lines of the federal Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA), to ensure that brownfield redevelopment
loans from private banks are made to businesses from within distressed neighborhoods. l53 They can adopt policies that link prospective purchaser and lender liability protections to whether the proposed redevelopment project will have tangible health and economic
benefits to the local community.
One possible model for integrating remediation reform with environmental justice is the federal Small Business Administration
(SBA).l54 SBA establishes a program which encourages federal agencies to favor small business enterprises (SBEs) in the awarding of
government contracts, as long as these SBEs possess the capacity and
expertise to perform the contracts.l55 SBNs program recognizes that:
(1) smaller enterprises, because of economies of scale and vertical
integration, are often underbid by larger national or international
companies; and (2) there are valid policy reasons for providing some
degree of protection for these smaller enterprises, which are often
owned by and employ workers from the local community, notwithstanding that these smaller enterprises can be underbid by larger
150 See

supra text accompanying notes 80-93.
See id.
152 See NRDC O.fficial: Broumfields Programs Offer E-Justice to Communities, ENVT WK.,
June 16, 1997, at 287-88.
153 See CRA Credits, supra note 89.
1&1 See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1994).
155 See Timothy S. Kerr, Small Business Preferences in Federal Procnrement, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 18, 1992, at 4.
151

1998]

ESSAY

617

national and international companies. l56 SBA provides a means to
protect and promote these neighborhood, community focused, businesses.
EPA and other state environmental agencies could establish liability release programs that operated similar to the SBA program. The
decision of whether to release a private party from future remediation
liability could be based, in part, on whether the private party is a
community enterprise. EPA and other state environmental agencies
could establish a policy expressly favoring community enterprises in
the granting of liability releases, or granting non-community enterprises less extensive releases from future remediation liability. SBAtype liability release programs would promote environmental justice
goals by helping to ensure that community enterprises participate in
the economic benefits of brownfields reclamation.
Another possible model for integrating remediation reform with
environmental justice are the Restoration Advisory Boards (RABs),
created to help deal with environmental cleanup issues relating to
military base closures.167 RABs are charged with helping develop and
monitor the remediation process.l68 In theory, RAB plans recognize
that military bases operate as integrated economic communities
rather than as isolated parcels of property, and that closure and
remediation have broad community repercussions.169 EPA and other
state environmental agencies could establish community based
boards, along the lines of RABs, that would help guide neighborhood
remediation policy and objectives. These RAB-type boards would
help ensure that government decisions regarding cleanup standards

166 See William J. Dennis et al., Small Business Job Creation: The Findings and Their Critics,
Bus. ECON., July 1994, at 23..
167 See Lenny Siegel, Key Lessons for Brownjields from the Base Closure Cleanup Process,
at 1 (Sept. 20, 1996) (unpublished fact sheet prepared in conjunction with CAREERIPRO, a
program of the San Francisco Urban Institute) (on file with author). This proposal is also based
on Lenny Siegel's presentation to the San Francisco Brownfields Working Group in July 1996,
during which he elaborated on how the RABs can serve as a potential model for increasing the
community focus of brownfields remediation.
168 See Naval Center Seeks Help From Public, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 5, 1996, at B3.
169 See Raymond Takashi Swenson, Remediating Military 'Brownjields,' NATL L.J., Nov. 6,
1995, at Cll.
The community and its citizens are given a formal voice in the remedial process
through a restoration advisory board that meets monthly with the EPA and state
remedial project managers at each closing base. The board is provided updates on the
progress of remedial investigation and action, and its input is solicited.
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and liability are dealt with from a community-based, rather than a
parcel-by-parcel, perspective.
Through the 1993 Executive Orderl60 and the 1995 NEJAC public
dialogues,161 the Clinton Administration has taken several bold symbolic steps in the area of environmental justice. Now what is needed
are policies to translate this rhetoric into political and economic reality, so that brownfields reclamation can contribute to the larger reclamation of America's troubled cities. The Community Reinvestment
Act, the Small Business Administration, and Restoration Advisory
Boards provide a starting point for developing and implementing such
policies.
CONCLUSION:

THE CITY IN CONTEXT

For centuries, the U.S. frontier was about breaking the land, pushing the geographic edges of development continuously outward. As
suburban sprawl, urban decay, and environmental pollution have
made plain, however, that frontier has reached its end. Ecologically,
economically, and politically, the paradigm of uncontrolled and continuous outward land development cannot be sustained.
The frontier before us now is about forging new relationships
among our cities, farmlands, and wildlands. It is about constructing
policies and economies that promote the health and livelihood of all
our citizens, not just the privileged. The effort to reconcile open space,
brownfields, and justice issues is on the leading edge of this new
frontier. The success or failure of this effort will impact not only the
fate of our cities, but the fate of our ecology and economy as well.

160 See

Exec. Order No. 12,898,3 C.F.R. 859 (1994) (reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321

(1994».
161

See supra text accompanying notes 120-26.

